We are being drawn into a dangerous whirlpool in the Black Sea. Serious concerns have now emerged in the littoral states of Romania and Bulgaria as well. Over the past month, merchant vessels have been attacked by drones in the exclusive economic zones of both countries, just outside their territorial waters. Among them was a Turkish-owned ship. The attacks claimed lives and left seafarers injured. May God rest the souls of the seafarers who lost their lives, and I wish the injured a speedy recovery.

No definitive conclusion has yet been reached as to who is responsible for these attacks off the territorial waters of the two countries. Suspicion is centred on Russia. However, the Bulgarian authorities have stated that the circumstances of the incident have not yet been clarified. While official Romanian sources have adopted a cautious stance on the matter, more definitive assessments of Russia’s responsibility can be found in Romanian open sources. The two countries appear to be turning towards consultation and cooperation with each other.

For now, both countries are acting cautiously with regard to Russia. They may not wish to confront Russia directly in the Black Sea. They give the impression of not wanting to act before the picture becomes clearer.

Yet the attacks continue. Dissenting voices have already begun to emerge in public opinion in these countries. It is being said that NATO has been slow to respond and that the commitments made are insufficient. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, for his part, stated that the Alliance would continue its close cooperation with its Black Sea allies and its monitoring of the security environment, and that deterrence and defence measures would be updated as necessary.

At present, there is clear uncertainty among the littoral states regarding threat assessment and the attribution of responsibility.

Some open sources report that Türkiye is working on a plan to bring together the countries bordering the Black Sea in order to establish a safe corridor for merchant vessels under the protection of warships.

If the aim is to establish such a corridor or corridors, coordination will also need to include Russia and Ukraine. Open sources do not identify any specific war zone declared by the parties in connection with these incidents.

Therefore, account should be taken of the War Risk Area declared by Ukraine in 2022 and 2023, as well as the statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine indicating that, in 2026, it issued an official warning regarding dangers of navigation in Russia’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea.

Establishing a corridor may confront us with a number of challenges.

The coordinates of the northern end of any potential corridors will be one of the most difficult aspects of the matter.  Will the corridors have extensions continuing into the risk areas declared by the parties? If so, will the parties assume this responsibility all the way to the entrances and exits of their own ports? Or will these corridors extend only as far as a point close to, or at a reasonable distance outside, the areas they have declared? What happens beyond that point? What kind of mechanism will be established to address the parties’ suspicions regarding the carriage of contraband of war?

On the other hand, neutral littoral states may also wish to establish safe navigation corridors in order to ensure the safety of navigation in their own passages and port approach waters.

Let us also consider the issue in light of the numerical data available to us.

According to the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure’s Istanbul Strait Ship Transit Statistical Summary Tables for the first and second quarters (1 January–30 June 2026), a total of 19,277 ship transits were made through the Istanbul Strait in both directions (approximately 107 ships per day). Of these, 11,148 were non-stop transits. Since the tables, which only provide statistics on ships passing through the Strait, do not show ports of destination, they give no indication of how many transits were bound for the risk area. Even so, this scale alone shows that protecting all of this traffic with escorted convoys is impractical. For this reason, the corridors may need to be risk-based and selective.

Furthermore, the question will arise of protecting convoys – made up of different groups that would include many of the merchant vessels – with combined task forces composed of Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian naval assets.

An unnamed source from the Romanian defence sector, speaking to the AP (The Associated Press), stated that Romanian merchant vessels lack air defence systems against drone attacks and that having warships escort these vessels would pose a high risk. It is also known that some foreign shipping companies have begun equipping their vessels with counter-drone systems. This is a measure that complements the escort model but cannot replace it.

In short, it is evident that this undertaking will not be as easy as it may appear from the outside.

In an environment where attacks can spill beyond the risk areas that the parties define in different ways, it appears that de-escalation will be needed first and foremost.

However, the political and military objectives of the warring parties are subject to change. Moreover, the parties’ operational command and control models lie outside the familiar patterns, and in this context we are confronted with structures dictated by hybrid warfare. I discussed this in my previous article through the example of Ukraine. Given this situation, it also becomes harder for potential security corridors to be accepted in a certain spirit of gentlemanly understanding. Nevertheless, as littoral states, we must produce a solution to this issue as soon as possible, without leaving any room for outside intervention.

Yet there is a strong sense that we are already late. The longer the delay, the newer and more difficult the issues that come onto the agenda.

For example, an interesting question is currently being debated in Romanian public opinion: whether Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty could be invoked in response to an attack occurring within the Exclusive Economic Zone. This interpretation appears legally debatable. The Exclusive Economic Zone is not a maritime area in which the coastal state enjoys full sovereignty, as it does in its territorial waters. Other states’ freedom of navigation continues within the framework of the conditions laid down by international law.

However, those who advance this theory may have reasoned from the pollution and potential wrecks that ships and their cargo could create in the Exclusive Economic Zone as a result of attacks on merchant vessels. It could be concluded that damage would be caused to living and non-living resources of economic value under the sea, as well as to elements such as cables and pipelines, if any. While this matter falls within the purview of experts in the law of the sea, I cannot judge how valid this hypothesis could be in a sea where pollution has already reached extreme levels.

Moreover, Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty allows the consultation mechanism to be activated whenever an ally considers that its territorial integrity, political independence or security is under threat.

First and foremost, the fire must be brought under control. It is best not to pour fuel on the fire with strained interpretations. Persuading the parties appears very difficult on every front. For example, US President Trump stated that the ceasefire reached between Ukraine and Russia to halt attacks on energy infrastructure had been violated by both sides.

In conclusion, maritime security corridors may be considered for the safety of navigation. However, securing the agreement of the warring parties on this matter and ensuring the sustainability of the corridor appear to be the most difficult aspects. The geographical scope of the corridors, the method of protection against threats, the authority to intervene and their sustainability should be assessed in conjunction with political consensus among the littoral states.

Problems arising from the internal dynamics of the conflicting parties and from their exposure to external actors may pave the way for outside influence on command and control processes or for the steering of security policies. There is no complete clarity on this matter. Indeed, in the face of the recent attacks, the Bulgarian and Romanian official authorities have been unable to state definitively who is responsible.

Attention must also be paid to initiatives that, under the pretext of external support, could go as far as relaxing the provisions of the Montreux Convention. The Convention limits the passage of warships of non-littoral states through the Straits, as well as their tonnage in the Black Sea and their duration of stay. In 2022, Türkiye applied the relevant provisions of the Montreux Convention and put into effect restrictions on the passage of warships through the Straits.

Although Rutte’s statement on updating deterrence and defence measures does not directly set out such an aim, it could pave the way for new debates on increasing the military presence in the Black Sea and on how this relates to the Montreux regime. A possible mechanism among the littoral states is therefore important not only for security but also for preserving the Convention regime.

In this situation, the establishment in Istanbul of a maritime security coordination mechanism open to the participation of all littoral states could be considered. Earlier cooperation in the Black Sea against the mine threat and initiatives for grain shipments have shown that, albeit under different circumstances, coordination can be built around specific problems. Early warning, information sharing, search and rescue, environmental protection and incident monitoring for the safety of navigation could be addressed within a common framework. UAV, armed UAV, missile and mine threats could also be included in this assessment within the framework of warnings concerning the safety of navigation.

However, priority should be given to Russia and Ukraine coming together on the basis of peace. The functioning of the corridors depends on the political and military consensus of the conflicting parties, and this consensus must also guarantee that the hostilities do not spill beyond the risk areas declared by the parties. Furthermore, such consensus may also be a prerequisite for overcoming some of the challenges in corridor planning. Neutral littoral states should act as facilitators and monitors of this process. This role requires that the mandates of the countries participating in the mechanism, the rules of engagement and the sharing of responsibilities be clarified in advance, and that compliance with the Montreux provisions be ensured. The aim is to prevent uncontrolled escalation and to implement, as soon as possible, measures that will reduce the risk of the conflict zone expanding.

 

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